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Abstract: In this article, I argue that, in showing inconsis-
tency of beliefs, Socratic elenchus is showing incompatibility of 
the desires those beliefs express.  This thesis explains Socrates’ 
claim that, in refuting Callicles, he is also restraining his desires. 
The beliefs in question are about the best kind of life to lead; 
such beliefs express the second order desire to lead a life in which 
certain sorts of first order desires are satisfied.  Socrates’ elenchus 
shows that Callicles is caught between two incompatible second 
order desires: a desire to lead of life of enormous pleasure and 
a desire to lead a life in which his love of honor is satisfied. 
Socrates does not succeed with Callicles because the way out 
of this dilemma depends on a type of desire not found in the 
moral psychology of the Gorgias, i.e., a desire whose satisfaction 
is pleasure unmixed with pain, described in Republic 583c-585e 
and Philebus 50e-52b.
Keywords: elenchus; consistency; belief; moral psychology; 
desire; pleasure. 
Resumen: En este artículo mantengo que al mostrar la 
inconsistencia de las creencias del interlocutor el elenchos 
socrático está mostrando la incompatibilidad de los deseos 
que esas creencias expresan. Esta tesis explica la declaración 
de Sócrates, cuando refuta a Calicles, de que él está también 
refrenando sus deseos. Las creencias en juego son respecto del 
mejor modo de vida; tales creencias expresan deseos de segundo 
orden para llevar a cabo una vida en la cual ciertas clases de 
deseos de primer orden son satisfechos. El elenchos de Sócrates 
Gregory Vlastos has given us an account of 
elenchus that continues to prove fruitful.  If we see 
Socratic refutation through the lens of deductive 
logic, its shortcomings are evident.  Refutation can 
achieve only so much; it shows the interlocutor an 
inconsistency in his beliefs.  However, inconsistency 
by itself cannot show which of two inconsistent 
beliefs is true—if indeed either is true.  This 
result is the one we seem to find in the Gorgias; 
Socrates leads Callicles to the point of recognizing an 
inconsistency in his set of beliefs.  It is clear which 
of the two beliefs Socrates thinks is true — and thus 
which Callicles ought to accept and which he ought 
to reject.  However, Calicles does not follow suit; 
he continues to resist the conclusion that Socrates 
holds out as the correct one. If Vlastos’ analysis is 
correct, Callicles is in an intellectual bind.  He has 
recognized an inconsistency in his beliefs but he has 
no way to resolve it.  Nothing in Socrates’ elenchus 
points to which of the two incompatible beliefs is 
true—if indeed either is true.
1
  However, as we shall 
see, Callicles’ problem is not entirely a skeptical 
quandary—an inability to arrive at a further set 
of premises that will settle the issue by showing 
which of the two inconsistent beliefs is true.  Rather, 
Callicles is invested in both beliefs and does not 
want to give up either.  These beliefs embody his 
1.  VLASTOS, 1991, P. 
111-115.
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muestra que Calicles está atrapado entre dos tipos de deseos 
de segundo orden que son incompatibles: el deseo de llevar 
adelante una vida de enorme placer, y el deseo de llevar 
una vida en la cual su amor por el honor sea satisfecho. 
Sócrates no tiene éxito con Calicles porque la escapatoria a 
este dilema depende de un tipo de deseo que no se encuentra 
en la psicología moral del Gorgias, a saber, un deseo cuya 
satisfacción es el placer no combinado con el dolor que se 
describe en R. 583c-585e y Phlb. 50e-52b.
Palabras claves: elenchos; consistencia; creencia; 
psicología moral; deseo; placer. 
ideal of what his life should be and articulate certain 
types of desire.  To attack them is to attack an under-
lying desire.  Given this dynamic, Socratic elenchus 
takes on another aspect.  All of its deductive power 
is aimed at these fundamental desires in order to 
promote some and restrain others.  However, even 
if we focus on this psychological aspect of Socratic 
elenchus, we have not thereby solved the problem 
that Vlastos pointed out.  Callicles is still left with 
deciding what fundamental desire to promote and 
which to restrain.
2
 Socrates lays the groundwork for 
understanding these desires in his elenchus of Polus. 
The conversation between Polus and Socrates 
begins with the issue of the power and prestige 
of rhetoric.  Polus holds the rhetoricians have the 
greatest power in the city because they, like the 
despots, can put to death whomever they wish 
(boulontai) and deprive of their property and exile 
from the city whomever it seems best to them (hon 
an doke(i) autois) to so treat (466c).  Securing 
Polus’ agreement to the difference between what one 
wishes and what one thinks best, Socrates leads him 
to the conclusion that despots do not necessarily do 
what they want in doing what seems best to them 
(468e). While this argument has the classic form of 
an elenchus, Polus refuses to accept the final step; 
his resistance is not just a question of logic either. 
Thus, the conversation continues through two more 
stages. For our purposes, the most significant is the 
next where Socrates refutes Polus’ belief that doing 
injustice is worse than suffering it (474c). This belief 
is important to Polus because it is integral to his 
profile of the rhetorician.  He thinks the rhetorician 
is like the despot, who has the greatest liberty in 
the city.  Since he thinks whether the despot acts 
justly or unjustly is immaterial, we can conclude 
that his liberty includes acting unjustly if he wants 
to (468e-469d).  In turn, Polus is surely thinking 
that the rhetorician has similar liberty to do what 
he wants, whether it is just or not.  Finally, we 
sense that Polus would like to be a rhetorician and 
therefore be able to act unjustly if that is what he 
wants to do.
However, in this stage of the elenchus, the 
dynamic between Socrates and Polus has shifted.  In 
answering Socrates, Polus becomes canny, distancing 
himself from complete assent by such expressions 
as ‘it appears so’ (phainetai) and ‘…according to 
this argument’ (kata getouton ton logon) (475e). 
Perhaps sensing this caution, when he approaches 
the conclusion of his elenchus, Socrates steps back 
from the substance of the argument and urges:
Do not shrink back from answering, Polus. You 
won’t get hurt in any way.  Submit yourself nobly to 
the argument, as you would to a doctor, and answer 
me. (475d-e)
3
 
While recognizing Polus’ fear that elenchus 
might harm him in some way, Socrates tries to put 
it into a context of medical treatment.  Polus see-
ms to fear the psychological pain of admitting his 
error — i.e., admitting that doing wrong is worse 
than suffering contradicts his previous claim.  It 
is not clear exactly what that pain is.  It might be 
the shame of having to admit to error publicly, in 
the face of the assembled friends and colleagues. 
However, Socrates’ reference to medical treatment 
points in another direction.
At the beginning of their conversation, 
Socrates tells Polus that rhetoric is not as prestigious 
as he thinks.  It is really a form of flattery (kolasia). 
In explaining this shocking idea, Socrates elaborates 
an extensive schema, comparing techne to knack 
(empeiria) (463a-465d).  He cites four technai. 
Two care for the body, physical training and medi-
cine; two care for the soul, legislation and judging. 
Corresponding to these technai are four knacks; 
cosmetic and cookery for the body and sophistry 
and rhetoric for the soul.  Technai are guided by 
2. For an earlier version of this 
thesis, see Parry (1996, 50-57, 
and notes).  In line with the 
work of others, I argued that 
elenchus in the Gorgias is not 
aimed just at consistency of 
beliefs but at compatibility of 
desires.  However, the desires 
in question are not first order 
desires, e.g., for food and drink, 
but second order desires.  For 
instance, the desire to lead a life 
of unrestrained satisfaction of 
appetites and the desire to lead a 
life of restrained and harmonious 
appetites are such second order 
desires.  In turn, the beliefs, 
whose inconsistency is shown by 
elenchus, express such second 
order desires.  In the Gorgias, 
then, Socrates sees elenchus 
as having the psychological 
function of restraining the former 
and promoting the latter by 
showing the inconsistency of 
the beliefs which express these 
desires.  However, I also argued 
that just because Socrates shows 
the incompatibility of these 
two desires, by showing the 
inconsistency of the beliefs that 
express these desires, it is not 
clear how he can show which 
desire should be preferred.
3. All passages from the Gorgias 
are cited in D. Zeyl’s translation, 
in Cooper (1997).
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knowledge because they can give a grounded reason 
for their procedure.  By contrast, knack aims not at 
what is best but only at pleasure; moreover, it has 
no account to give of its procedure but is based only 
on experience of what has happened in the past. 
Finally, knack is deceptive because it wears the mask 
of techne; although ignorant, it pretends to offer 
what is best.  Since it substitutes pleasure for what 
is best, the suggestion is that what is best is not 
always pleasant.  Socrates says that in a contest 
between a pastry cook and a doctor, before children 
or childish men, the pastry cook would win.  When 
he invokes the image later, he makes clear that the 
reason is that doctors mete out painful treatment 
whereas pastry cooks provide (unhealthy) pleasure 
(521e-522a).
While Socrates will further refine this fourfold 
schema, we have enough to appreciate Socrates’ 
exhortation to Polus.  In comparing elenchus 
to medicine, he is explaining that its pain is 
therapeutic the way medical treatment is therapeu-
tic.  Of course, medicine treats the body, but Socra-
tes’ elenchus does not aim at treating Polus’ body. 
Rather, Socrates is referring to the analogy between 
medicine and judging.  The latter treats the soul. 
So the painful treatment of elenchus is aimed at 
Polus’ soul, although exactly how is not clear at this 
point.  Still, Socrates’ elaboration, in the third stage 
of this conversation, on the function of judging 
offers some insight.  In this stage, Socrates aims 
to refute Polus’ belief that escaping punishment for 
doing injustice is better than undergoing it (474b). 
In rough outline, he argues, first of all, undergoing 
just punishment is the same as the wrong-doer 
being justly disciplined (476a).  Since justice is fine, 
Socrates argues that just punishment is something 
fine.  Thus, the one who undergoes just punishment 
suffers what is good for his soul; in fact, he is being 
relieved of vice (476b-477b).  However, just as 
painful treatment is integral to medicine, so painful 
treatment is integral to undergoing punishment in 
the court—being chastised, rebuked, and paying 
the penalty (houtosd’en ho nouthetoumenoste kai 
epiplettomenos kai dikendidous) (478e).  What is 
significant is the role of pain in ridding the soul 
of vice.  Since Socrates does not explain how 
punishment can have this effect, he seems to as-
sume a commonly accepted belief that the pain of 
punishment causes one to reconsider his actions, or 
even his attitudes.  In any event, Socrates focuses 
not on the physical pain of punishment, as Polus 
does (473c-d).  Rather, he talks about chastisement 
and rebuke, which are psychological; he seems to 
portray the shame experienced in a courtroom when 
condemnation is pronounced.
If we return to Socrates’ exhortation to Po-
lus, he implies that admitting error is painful but 
beneficial, like medical treatment.  However, we can 
now see that the psychological pain of admitting 
error is closer to that of undergoing just punishment. 
Socrates, then, is suggesting a psychological benefit 
from admitting error.  So, Socrates is describing 
his elenchus of Polus as implying more than the 
embarrassment of publicly admitting that he has 
contradicted himself.  Rather, it should improve 
his soul by making him face a contradiction in 
his beliefs.  Moreover, the analogy with judicial 
punishment, as Socrates conceives of it, implies 
that the psychological improvement goes beyond 
rendering Polus’ beliefs consistent; it aims at his 
behavior and attitudes.  These themes are explored 
in the conversation with Callicles.
The idea of elenchus as punishment is more 
pointed in the conversation with Callicles in that 
desire becomes its focus.  This dramatic exchange 
begins with Socrates and Callicles sparing over the 
kind of life one ought to lead.  Socrates follows 
philosophy, of course; and Callicles pursues political 
power through rhetoric.  Callicles’ interest leads 
Socrates to make a very serious charge, which is 
methodologically fraught.  While Socrates is in 
love with Alcibiades and with philosophy, Callicles 
is in love with Demos, son of Pyrilampes, and the 
Athenian demos.  Moreover, he is incapable of 
contradicting his beloved; if the assembly contra-
dicts what he is saying, changing course he says 
what it wishes (481d-e).  Besides insinuating the 
theme of flattery into the conversation, this char-
ge implies what Callicles says is motivated by his 
desire to please the assembly.  There is a causal link 
between what he professes to believe and what he 
desires.  However, this banter will give way to a 
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more serious theme.  Later in this section of their 
conversation, Socrates commends Callicles for his 
knowledge, good-will, and frankness because, toge-
ther they test the soul concerning the correctness of 
one’s life (basaneinhikanos psyches periorthoszoes) 
(486e-487a).  He also says that Callicles challenges 
him on the issue of what kind of man he should be 
and what to pursue, and up to what point, throu-
ghout his life from youth to old age (487e-488a). 
Of course, we know that Socrates’ elenchus will do 
the same for Callicles, testing and challenging him 
on these same topics.
4
 The result is that Socrates is 
framing their conversation in terms of the kind of life 
one ought to lead.  Socrates’ refutation, then, does 
not just aim at Callicles’ beliefs about a random topic 
but at his fundamental beliefs about the best way to 
live.  At the same time, while Callicles couches his 
beliefs in general terms, Socrates places Callicles’ 
beliefs in the frame of his love for the Athenian 
demos, thereby making clear that what is at stake is 
the way Callicles thinks he should live his own life.
In fact, Socrates leads Callicles to make a 
declaration about the best kind of life.  Callicles 
starts by saying that nature itself shows clearly 
that it is just for the better to have more than the 
worse and the more able than the less (483c-d). 
We have no doubt that Callicles sees himself as 
better and more able; and it is rhetoric that makes 
him so.  Socrates sets about undermining Callicles’ 
claim, focusing on the notions of the powerful, 
better, and stronger since Callicles slides from one 
notion to the other.  Callicles, reflecting Socrates’ 
original characterization, changes his account 
until they arrive at the idea that the stronger are 
intelligent (phronimoi) in the affairs of the city, in 
the way it should be managed; not only intelligent 
but brave, able to achieve what they intend—not 
flinching through softness of soul (491a-b).  While 
this summary begins in an unsurprising way, it ends 
on a sinister note.  What softness of soul is needing 
to be overcome?  One might suspect Callicles is 
referring to the conventional notions of justice that 
he previously dismissed—the ones implanted in the 
souls of the naturally stronger in order to subdue 
them (483b-484a).  In any event, he claims these 
determined individuals should rule in the city and 
should, according to natural justice, have more than 
the others, i.e., the ruled (491c-d).
The dramatic artistry of the next question 
reveals that Socrates understands Callicles to be 
enunciating his own ideal of living.  In asking 
whether these naturally suited rulers should rule 
over themselves as well as others, Socrates is 
asking whether his ideal entails Callicles ruling 
over himself.  By self-rule, he clarifies that he 
means moderation and self-control, ruling over 
one’s own pleasures and desires (ton hedonon kai 
epithumionarchonta ton enheautou) (491d-e).  This 
line of inquiry introduces the notion of desire and 
pleasure into the discourse—themes that will be 
central for the rest of the dialogue.  It also provokes 
an explosive response from Callicles that leaves no 
doubt that he sees Socrates’ question about self-rule 
as aimed at himself—and not just at an abstract 
claim about the best kind of life to lead.  He asks 
how a man who is enslaved to anyone at all could 
be happy.  He replies to this rhetorical question 
by invoking what is admirable and just according 
to nature.
CI The man who’ll live correctly ought to allow his 
own appetites to get as large as possible and not restrain 
them.  And when they are as large as possible, he ought 
to be competent to devote himself to them by virtue 
of his bravery and intelligence (phronesin), and to fill 
them with whatever he may have an appetite for at the 
time. (491e-492a)
CI is a universal statement about all men who 
would live correctly.  As such it applies to Callicles 
himself; and he cannot but mean for it to apply to 
himself.  It is not just an observation but is also 
a declaration of aspiration or even intent.  Moreo-
ver, by repeating the notions of intelligence and 
bravery, Callicles links this hedonistic manifesto to 
his account of those who are stronger.  Previously, 
he was veiled in his reference to the object of their 
intelligence and bravery—what they intended to 
achieve, pushing aside their softness of soul.  Now 
we see that they must be intelligent and brave with 
respect to their desires.  Being knowledgeable about 
their desires, they will understand them apart from 
4. Cf. BRICKHOUSE & SMITH, 
1991, p. 136-140.
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the conventions about moderation, to allow them to 
grow as large as possible.  Then they must be brave 
enough to provide these unrestrained desires with 
what they need.  Of course, it is understood that 
satisfying such desires is pleasurable.  He charges 
that most people are incapable of this kind of life 
“because they lack the ability to provide for them-
selves fulfillment of their pleasures.”
As the rest of the conversation shows, 
Callicles has not thought through what a life of 
unrestrained desire would actually entail.  His lack 
of philosophical thoroughness is all too evident. 
Nevertheless, he is holding out a kind of hedonis-
tic ideal, one that has a prima facie plausibility. 
Desire is a kind of need or emptiness whose filling 
is pleasurable.  The greater the need the greater the 
pleasure.  Restraining desire means restraining the 
need and limiting the pleasure.  But restraining the 
desire is unnatural and forecloses the possibility of 
the greatest possible pleasure.  People restrain desire 
only because they are afraid of the consequences; 
their fear is borne of ignorance and cowardice.  But 
for those who are capable, it is possible to pursue 
pleasure without restraint.  The obstacles to doing 
so are not internal and natural but external and 
conventional.  Thus, one needs something like 
rhetoric to acquire the power to defy the external 
and conventional restraints on the project of follo-
wing the desires where they naturally lead.
Against this ideal of endless pleasure, 
Socrates poses the prospect of endless servitude to 
desire.  Seizing on Callicles’ idea that pleasure comes 
from filling desire, he retells a story, by a clever 
Sicilian or Italian, that uses the image of jars.  The 
part of the soul where desires are found he says is 
persuadable and changes back and forth.  In Greek 
this description allows the pun that this part of 
the soul is a jar.  The relation between desires and 
persuasion deserves serious attention.  We do not 
know the kind of desire in question; they might 
be anything from bodily appetites to desires for a 
state of affairs—e.g., the desire to be powerful in 
the city.  In any event, the juxtaposition of desires 
and persuasion is not accidental; in this part of 
the soul, beliefs, opinions, even appearances are 
unstable, presumably because they are affected by 
the instability of desire.  In this part of the soul, 
then, what one believes depends on what one de-
sires.  It is hard not to see Socrates as aiming his 
remarks at Callicles’ fascination with desire; he is 
warning him about being in a region where illusion 
is rife.  The story-teller says that in the uninitiated, 
i.e., the thoughtless, this part of the soul, where 
the desires are, is unrestrained (akolaston) and 
not tightly closed; so he calls it a leaky jar, be-
cause it is insatiable.  In the rest of the story, the 
uninitiated are condemned to fill the leaky jar using 
a sieve (493a-c).
Since the story does not phase Callicles, 
Socrates tells a different version, which elaborates 
on the image of jars. An unstrained life and a 
moderate one are represented as two men with jars 
needing to be filled, with wine, honey, milk, and 
other unspecified stuff.  The moderate man has 
sound and filled jars.  Although the commodities are 
scarce and obtained only by difficult effort, he does 
not pour any more in, once filled.  No longer thinking 
about them, he enjoys calm about the matter. The 
unrestrained man, like the other, finds the sources 
possible but difficult; however, his jars being leaky 
and rotten, he is forced to fill them day and night 
or suffer the greatest pains (493e-494a).  Socrates 
asks Callicles, in the face of this story, whether 
the orderly life is better than the unrestrained. 
Callicles rejects the suggestion because he takes 
the jars to stand for desire.  Since pleasure comes 
from filling desire, the man with the filled jars has 
no pleasure; he is like a stone.  The ideal is the 
greatest amount of inflow (494a-b).  Callicles has 
alighted on an awkward feature of Socrates’ story. 
Without explicitly making the comparison, he has 
invited Callicles to think of the jars as desire and, 
thus, of their filling as pleasure.  The story, then, 
suggests a desire can be filled once and for all, thus 
ending all pleasure.  However, we will not dwell on 
Callicles’ objection to Socrates but will pursue the 
refutation that is about to unfold.  It begins with 
Callicles’ admission that he holds pleasure and the 
good are the same (495a).  In the longer argument 
that finally leads Callicles to change his position, at 
499b-c, he claims that some pleasures are better and 
some are worse.  With this concession, Socrates gets 
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him to agree that some pleasures are beneficial and 
some are harmful (499d).  Then he reintroduces the 
fourfold schema of technai and knacks, now revised 
so as to be relevant to the issue of choosing which 
pleasures are good and which are bad (500a).
At first, Socrates distinguishes between 
cookery and medicine on the basis that medicine 
investigates the nature of the person it treats and 
the reason for what it does; it has an account to 
give of each.  He assumes what he said before, 
that this knowledge aims at what is best for the 
body, whereas cookery aims only at bodily pleasure. 
Because it has no account to give, Socrates implies 
it does not care about what is best for the body. 
Next, he turns this distinction between medicine and 
cookery into an analogy for two occupations aimed 
at the soul.  Some are knowledgeable, exercising 
forethought about what is best for the soul; others 
dismiss this and consider only the pleasure of the 
soul, and how to provide it, without investigating 
which pleasures are better and worse (501a-c). 
One of the latter types of occupation is rhetoric, as 
we know from the conversation with Polus.  Now, 
however, Socrates is developing the idea that it 
provides a kind of pleasure to the soul, analogous 
to the way cookery provides pleasure to the body. 
Since Callicles is aware of the aim of this analogy, 
he becomes reserved in his responses.  Nevertheless, 
Socrates forges ahead in his account of the way 
rhetoric provides only pleasure without regard for 
what is best for the soul.
Socrates’ first examples of pleasures of the 
soul are those of music and poetry.  We can see 
that such pleasures are different from the pleasures 
of eating and drinking.  Of course, music might be 
thought to belong only to the ear and, thus, to be 
only bodily.  However, the pleasure of poetry seems 
more likely to be psychological than bodily, recoun-
ting and provoking, as it does, the emotions of love, 
hatred, fear, and joy.  In the Republic, Socrates 
says that poetry, in gratifying the emotion of grief, 
provides pleasure.  These sorts of pleasures are cle-
arly different from the pleasures of bodily appetite; 
with pleasures of the soul, the idea of filling what 
is empty becomes metaphorical, as in being thirsty 
for crying (R. 606a-b).  Nevertheless, Socrates, in 
introducing a different kind of pleasure, suggests 
a different kind of desire, internally more complex 
than bodily thirst.  Crying over the situation of a 
protagonist in a drama already implies that the 
object of the emotion has a structure, e.g., the 
protagonist has suffered a loss.  Taking pleasure in 
crying over this situation implies another structural 
layer.
In any event, Socrates focuses on the issue 
of the way poetry conveys this pleasure, in parti-
cular whether it merely gratifies or not.  He posits 
the possibility that tragic poetry might leave aside 
something gratifying but bad for the audience.  It 
might even say what is unpleasant but beneficial 
(502b-c).  Of course, this possibility is denied; but it 
presages a very important theme, that there is a type 
of discourse that does not just gratify its audience 
and even tells it unpleasant but beneficial things. 
Socrates, in fact, asks whether there is a type of 
rhetoric that tries to make the souls of the citizens 
as good as possible, striving to say what is best, 
whether it is more pleasant or more unpleasant for 
the audience (503a-b).  Callicles does not directly 
answer but cites what he thinks are examples of 
orators who have improved Athens—Themistocles, 
Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles.  Socrates’ answer 
returns to the idea of desire and pleasure.  These 
figures, he claims, filled their own desires and those 
of others; however, that is different from the techne 
that satisfies those desires whose satisfaction makes 
men better and does not satisfy those that make 
them worse (503c-d).  Later in their conversation, 
Socrates returns to these orators.  He ironically com-
mends them for having been better able to provide 
what the city desires than the orators of his day 
(mallonhoioiteekporizeinte(i) poleihonepethumei). 
What the Athenians then desired were ships, walls, 
arsenals, and other such things.  However, these 
orators failed in the other task of diverting these 
desires (metabibazeintasepithumias) rather than 
yielding to them, and persuading and forcing the 
Athenians to what would make them better citizens 
(517b-c).  This sort of desire, which is the target 
of the older rhetoricians, shows another kind of 
complexity.  First of all, the object of the desire is 
most plausibly seen as a state of affairs, i.e., that 
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the Athens have defensive walls.  Desiring a state 
of affairs is very different from desiring a glass of 
water, as we shall see.  Second, when he refers to 
diverting this sort of desire, Socrates suggests that 
the Athenians desire walls as a means to a goal.  If 
the Athenians desire walls as a means to the goal 
of defense, then their desire can be diverted to 
other objects, if these are better means to the goal. 
Socrates, of course, has a more complex goal in 
mind than the merely physical defenses of the city.
This elaboration of the practice of the ol-
der orators suggests the way in which they were 
crowd-pleasers.  If the Athenians wanted ships, 
walls, and arsenals, then giving them such things 
would please them.  But, of course, a speech in the 
assembly by itself would not give them ships, walls, 
and arsenals and thus would not satisfy the desire 
and provide pleasure.  However, Socrates claims 
that it is what the rhetoricians say that is plea-
sing.  Furthermore, the desire for this war-making 
equipment is not fundamental; it is based on a 
more basic desire, say, to be secure or even to be a 
hegemonic power in the whole of Greece.  Of course, 
a speech cannot satisfy those desires either.  Rather, 
a speech provides a kind of psychological pleasure 
by telling an audience what it wants to hear.  If the 
Athenians want to be secure or to be a hegemonic 
power, what they want to hear is that ships, walls, 
and arsenals will make them secure and a hegemonic 
power; or that being secure and a hegemonic power 
in this way is a good idea.  An orator who claimed 
that kind of thing would definitely provide them a 
kind of psychological pleasure.  However, that kind 
of speech might gratify a desire that ought not to be 
gratified.  If ships, walls, and arsenals do not provide 
security and hegemony or if that kind of security 
and hegemony is not good for the city, the desire to 
hear those sorts of claim made and defended ought 
not to be gratified.  According to Socrates, a good 
orator would tell the disappointing and unpleasant 
truth.  For instance, he might have to say that only 
virtue can provide the kind of security and hegemony 
that is good for the city.
At this point, their conversation is reaching a 
crisis.  Socrates starts to make his account of techne 
even more pointed. The good man, who speaks for 
what is best, does not say what he says at random, 
but with a view to some goal.  Just as all craftsmen 
have in view their own goal, each aims at some 
form for what it works on.  Painters, house-builders, 
shipwrights, each brings a certain form to what he 
makes; he forces the different parts to suit one ano-
ther and to harmonize until he has made the whole 
into an organized and well-ordered product.  Finally, 
physical trainers and physicians also make bodies 
organized and well-ordered (503d-504a).  In this 
speech Socrates is developing his account of techne 
by characterizing the good that it accomplishes.  He 
portrays what techne works on as made of parts that 
have a certain resistance to being brought together. 
House-builders and shipwrights, especially, have 
to fashion their materials into a certain shape and 
then fasten them together.  The timbers in ships, 
for instance, must be bent and curved to form a 
hull.  So, force is necessary to make a harmonized 
and well-ordered whole.  This theme of forcing parts 
together picks up the idea that techne must do 
what is unpleasant.  If medicine and judging have 
to administer unpleasant treatment, part of the 
unpleasantness might be forcing disparate parts of 
body or soul to harmonize.
Next, Socrates turns to the body and the soul 
in order to apply to them what he has said about 
order and regularity.  If a house or a ship has these 
qualities, it is good.  Socrates asks whether the 
same holds for bodies and souls.  To this question 
Callicles agrees in a reluctant and conditional reply. 
Nevertheless, Socrates pushes ahead.  Callicles 
readily admits that in the body regularity and 
order are strength and health.  He seems to have 
in mind the regularity of the parts of the body and 
their relation to one another.  But then Socrates 
moves to more contentious territory by asking him 
to name regularity and order in the soul.  When 
Callicles balks, Socrates supplies the answer.  In 
the soul these states are called lawful and law, 
whereby one becomes law-abiding and orderly.  That 
whereby one becomes law-abiding and orderly are 
justice and self-control (504b-d).Callicles refused 
to answer because he anticipated this result, which 
calls into question his earlier claim that self-control 
is foolishness (491e).  If he continues down this 
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road, he might have to admit that his ideal of a life 
characterized by self-indulgence, liberty, and license 
is really lawless and disorderly.  So, Socrates will 
now turn the screw a little tighter.
So this is what the skilled and good orator will look 
to when he applies to people’s souls whatever speeches 
he makes as well as all of his actions, and any gift he 
makes or any confiscation he carries out.  He will always 
give his attention to how justice may come to exist in 
the souls of his fellow citizens and injustice be gotten 
rid of, how self-control may come to exist there and 
lack of discipline be gotten rid of, and how the rest of 
excellence may come into being there and badness may 
depart.  Do you agree or not? (504d-e)
To this question, Callicles agrees without 
apparent demure.  But then Socrates switches back 
to the analogy with medicine in order to reintroduce 
the topic of desire.  It does no good to give a sick 
body lots of even the most pleasant of food and drink 
if doing so will not benefit it more than doing the 
opposite.  In fact, physicians allow the healthy to 
satisfy their hunger and thirst as much as they like; 
but they practically never allow the sick to fill their 
appetites.  After Callicles’ agreement, Socrates then 
alleges something analogous for souls.
As long as it’s corrupt, in that it’s foolish, 
undisciplined, unjust and impious, it should be kept away 
from its appetites and not be permitted to do anything 
other than what will make it better. (505 b)
Although Callicles again agrees, he is about 
to withdraw from this conversation.  Claiming that 
keeping it away from its appetites is restraining 
or disciplining appetites, Socrates concludes that 
restraining is better for the soul than lack of 
restraint, adding that Callicles had just maintained 
the opposite (505b-c).
At this point Callicles abruptly breaks off the 
conversation.  Socrates’ pregnant reply is that Calli-
cles cannot endure being made better by undergoing 
what they were just talking about, being restrained 
(kolazemenos) (505c).  What appears to be almost 
an aside actually brings together in a revealing 
way several themes.  First, by invoking not just the 
idea of restraint but also the context of that idea in 
the analogy with medicine, Socrates compares his 
elenchus to a techne that restrains and disciplines. 
Clearly, it is not restraining a bodily appetite, the 
way medicine does.  Socrates’ refutation is like the 
techne that restrains the soul in order to make it 
better.  In that regard, he is characterizing his 
refutation of Callicles in therapeutic terms just 
as he did with Polus (475d-e).  Second, in the 
conversation with Callicles, the idea of restraining 
has become the idea of restraining desire.  Socrates 
has just asked whether holding someone back from 
(eirgein) his desires is restraining (kolazein) him. 
Upon Callicles’ agreement, Socrates asks whether 
restraining is better for the soul than unrestraint. 
When Callicles balks, Socrates accuses him of refu-
sing to be restrained.  Socrates leaves hanging in 
the air the modus tollens move.  If Callicles’ desires 
are held back, he is restrained; so, if he refuses to be 
restrained, his desires are not held back.  Thus, this 
elenchus is not just showing Callicles that he holds 
contradictory beliefs; admitting to contradictory 
beliefs also restrains or disciplines this desire, or 
these desires.  The idea that elenchus is a therapy 
aimed at restraining desire is confirmed by the ou-
trageous claim that Socrates makes toward the end 
of the monologue that completes this conversation. 
Alluding to his unflattering assessment of Athenian 
statesmen, he says about himself:
I believe that I’m one of a few Athenians — so as 
not to say I’m the only one, but the only one among 
our contemporaries — to take up the true political craft 
and practice true politics.  This is because the speeches 
I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification 
but at what’s best.  They don’t aim at what’s most 
pleasant. (521d-e)
Socrates’ speeches are not speeches in the 
usual sense but are his refutations.  Clearly, they 
are not pleasant; as we can see in the case of Polus 
and Callicles, the pain consists in having to admit to 
contradicting oneself.  In his claim about politics, 
Socrates implies that elenchus does not gratify.  It 
does not just fail to please; it causes pain by not 
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fulfilling a desire.  If being refuted fails to gratify 
in this way, it does so because it disappoints some 
expectation.  It has thwarted Callicles by depriving 
him of something he wanted.
We have already noted that Socrates’ elenchus 
aims at fundamental beliefs about the kind of life 
one ought to lead.  However, Socrates’ aligning 
elenchus with technai, like medicine, that have a 
therapeutic function, opens up a new dimension of 
elenchus.  It does not just challenge these beliefs, 
it also restrains desire.
5
 In the medical analogy, the 
desire to be restrained is a bodily appetite; it is 
an emptiness that needs to be filled.  At first, one 
might think that the desire of Callicles that is to 
be restrained is some appetite that he has allowed 
to grow as large as possible.  However, we have no 
reason to believe that Callicles actually has such a 
desire, even if he wants to be the sort of person 
who has such appetites.  Socrates has argued that, 
besides those occupations like cookery that aim at 
pleasures of the body, there are others like poetry 
that aim at pleasures of the soul.  He put rhetoric 
into this second category although he also posited 
a kind of rhetoric that does more than gratify 
its audience.  Since Socrates clearly had his own 
elenchus in mind, we can understand his 
treatment of Callicles in that context.  His elenchus is 
unpleasant not for the body but for the soul. 
Throughout the dialogue, pleasure is assumed to 
be satisfaction of desire.  What follows is that 
pleasure of the soul is satisfaction of a desire of 
the soul; pain in the soul is not satisfying a desire 
of the soul.  Of course, Socrates does not elaborate 
such a distinction between bodily and psychological 
desires.  It is nevertheless open to the reader to see 
the psychological pain of elenchus as deriving from 
the disciplining of a desire that belongs properly 
to the soul.  What that desire might be is not at 
all clear.  
Since refuting beliefs restrains desire, we are 
forced to the conclusion that the belief refuted 
and the desire restrained are articulated with one 
another.  We know that Socrates’ refutation aims at 
the belief that to live correctly one ought to allow 
his appetites to grow as large as possible and not 
restrain them.  What it will show is that Callicles 
holds beliefs (or agrees to propositions) that imply 
unrestrained desire is the opposite of the way to 
live correctly; thus, he holds beliefs that contradict 
something articulated in CI (505b-c).  The elenchus 
is aimed at this belief.  However, if the elenchus also 
restrains a desire — as Socrates says it does — it 
can do so only if the belief also expresses a desire to 
lead a life of unrestrained bodily appetites.  Socratic 
elenchus can target the desire to lead such a life 
only if CI expresses this desire.  So, when Callicles 
says that the man who’ll live correctly ought to 
allow his own appetites to get as large as possible, 
his belief also expresses a desire to live that kind of 
life.  Then when Socrates shows that this belief is 
inconsistent with another belief Callicles holds, he 
is also targeting the desire to lead this kind of life. 
Thus, the kind of desire that Socrates is 
targeting is one whose content is a state of affairs. 
In English, this sort of desire can be expressed by 
the verb ‘want’ and an infinitive.  One can say, “I 
want him to leave.” or “I want the New York Yankees 
to lose.”  The range of the verb can vary in extent. 
For instance, “I want to lead a life of unrestrained 
bodily appetites” ranges over a whole life.  There is 
a difference between an appetite for something to 
drink and the desire to be a certain type of person 
who has that appetite.  It is the latter kind of desire 
that can be restrained by Socratic elenchus.  As we 
shall see in more detail below, Socrates will focus 
on Callicles’ other desire, to be a brave man.  If 
Callicles wants to lead a life of unrestrained 
appetites and if he also wants to be a brave man, 
then he is vulnerable to Socratic elenchus if it 
shows leading a life of unrestrained appetites is 
incompatible with being a brave man.  Further, if 
the elenchus shows that he has reason to want to 
be brave rather than to lead a life of unrestrained 
appetite, then it restrains the desire to lead a life 
of unrestrained appetite.  So, Socratic elenchus 
can restrain desire only if the desire is a desire for 
a state of affairs.  If so, Socrates has opened the 
scope of elenchus by introducing into the soul desire 
for states of affairs.
However, if he introduces such desires he must 
also introduce a type of belief that expresses the 
desirability of such states of affairs.  It is this kind 
5. See Carone (2004, p. 55-96), 
where she maintains that there is 
an intimate connection between 
belief and desire (p. 68-70); and 
this connection explains why 
elenchus is effective in promoting 
virtue (p. 79-81).  While her 
interpretation is aimed at showing 
that the moral psychology in the 
Gorgias does not imply two kinds 
of motivation, one rational and 
the other non-rational, the present 
investigation does not pursue 
those issues.
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of belief that will be the material of his elenchus; it 
is these beliefs whose consistency or inconsistency 
is at stake.  In turn, their inconsistency will show 
that the desires they express are incompatible.  If 
desires are shown to be incompatible, one cannot 
fulfill both.  If someone, in Kierkegaard’s Denmark, 
wants to be a minister of religion and a stage actor, 
both desires are for a way of life.  Reflection on 
these two desires, in the cultural context, shows 
that one cannot follow both ways of life.  The two 
desires, then, are incompatible; and one cannot 
fulfill both.  Similarly, if Socrates shows Callicles that 
the life of enormous pleasure is inconsistent with 
being a brave man, he shows that Callicles’ desire 
to lead a life of enormous pleasure is incompatible 
with his desire to be a brave man.  He cannot fulfill 
both desires.
6
 Of course, we know that realizing the 
incompatibility does not itself show Callicles which 
type of life is more desirable.
7
 Even if we could solve 
this puzzle, we are left with a further puzzle, how 
to construe the resolution of incompatible desires 
as restraining one of them.  However, we can put 
these puzzles aside because Callicles, even if he sees 
the incompatibility of these two desires, does not 
attempt to resolve it; nor does he restrain the desire 
at which Socrates is aiming, i.e., the desire to lead a 
life of enormous pleasure.  So, the solution of these 
puzzles is beyond the scope of the conversation; our 
analysis of the elenchus must remain at the point 
where Callicles stops.
If this account of elenchus is correct, Socra-
tes is aiming to change what Callicles wants his 
life to be.  However, it is clear that Socrates is not 
successful.  Callicles is angry, annoyed, and even 
resentful; but he does not reconsider CI.  It is worth 
trying to find out why.  If we start with CI, we can 
see that it harbors two different sorts of desire to 
lead a kind of life.  The first desire is expressed in 
the first claim in CI: the man who’ll live correctly 
ought to allow his own appetites to get as large as 
possible and not restrain them.  The second desire 
is expressed in the following claim: and when they 
are as large as possible, he ought to be competent 
to devote himself to them by virtue of his bravery 
and intelligence (phronesin), and to fill them with 
whatever he may have an appetite for at the time. 
We might say that Callicles wants a life of enormous 
pleasure but he wants to be someone who is also 
brave in the pursuit of pleasure.  So, not just any 
headlong pursuit of a life of enormous pleasure will 
do.  It must be intelligent and brave.  This sort of 
bravery is clever enough to see through the conven-
tions of justice which are only the self-interested 
rules the weak contrive.  The inferior sort lack the 
ability to achieve such pleasure; they praise justice 
and temperance because of their cowardice (491e-
-492b).  Callicles’ sort of bravery pushes aside these 
rules in spite of conventional censure.
This idea of bravery seems quite powerful. 
One can imagine Callicles thinking that it would 
inspire admiration in some quarters, its audacious 
disregard of justice and temperance seeming heroic. 
At this point, one is tempted to ask how far Callicles 
might go in kicking over the traces of convention. 
For instance, in one account, the catamite could be 
considered brave in the pursuit of pleasure by dis-
regarding the conventions of manliness.  Again, the 
coward in battle might feel relief at the withdrawal 
of the enemy because he values the life of enormous 
pleasure more than the honor of dying in war.  In one 
account, he is as good as the brave man who is also 
relieved, but presumably for different reasons.  As 
Socrates shows, Callicles is not prepared to accept ei-
ther account. The reason is that his notion of bravery 
is conventional, although at first it looks anything 
but conventional.  Bravery that pushes aside justice 
is certainly not everyone’s idea of being brave. Still, 
there are other ways in which Callicles’ notion of 
bravery is quite conventional.
8
 In the refutation of 
Callicles, Socrates uses two examples, to which we 
have just alluded: the catamite (494c-495a) and the 
coward (497d-499d). The life of a catamite violates 
the conventions of manliness; the conventions about 
bravery rest on a sharp distinction from cowardice. 
Callicles may think bravery in the service of pleasure 
will disregard the conventions about what is unjust; 
but he does not think that bravery in the pursuit of 
pleasure will disregard the conventions about what 
is manly in eros.  Nor can he countenance the thou-
ght that the brave man is as good as the coward; 
he adheres to the conventional distinction between 
bravery and cowardice in battle.
6. Charles Kahn argues that 
Socratic elenchus’ ability to 
establish one belief over another 
depends on everyone’s desire for 
the good.  Since the object of this 
desire is really virtue, elenchus is 
able to show that beliefs like CI 
are incompatible with virtue.  Of 
course, if elenchus works in this 
way, it must somehow be effective 
even though Callicles is unaware 
that his desire for the good is 
really a desire for virtue.  Kahn 
says the desire for the good is 
an unconscious desire for virtue.  
He allows that the reader—if 
not Callicles—sees in Socrates’ 
refutation a distinction between 
two conceptions of desire.  Finally, 
he claims that, in the Gorgias, 
Plato is unable to resolve the 
issue, which awaits developments 
in the Republic and Symposium. 
Cf. KAHN, 1983, p. 114-121.
7. Some commentators argue 
that, while Socrates may employ 
elenchus with his interlocutors, 
he also uses shame as an extra-
rational motivation.  See for 
instance Moss (2005, p. 137-170).  
My interpretation is consistent 
with Callicles’ feeling shame at 
the prospect of being (seen as) a 
coward.  However, it still supports 
the role of elenchus as showing 
Callicles holds inconsistent 
beliefs.  One of those beliefs, 
about the difference between 
being brave and cowardly, is 
intimately connected with his 
desire to be (seen as) brave; this 
desire is doubtless rooted in his 
sense of honor.  So, he might 
well feel shame at the prospect 
that he might not be brave in 
some context.  Still, the elenchus 
works by showing inconsistent 
beliefs that express incompatible 
desires.  See also Futter (2009, p. 
451-461).
8. See Woolf (2000, p. 1-40), 
where he argues that Callicles 
holds contradictory beliefs but is 
unable to resolve the contradiction 
because more than logic is at 
issue.  He locates this extra-
logical factor in Callicles’ love 
(eros) for the Athenian demos (p. 
24-32).  Woolf even alleges that 
Callicles is so conflicted that we 
can think of there being a Callicles 
1 (who seeks self-fulfillment in 
defiance of society’s conventions) 
and a Callicles 2 (who seeks 
validation from society) (p. 1-5).  
While this interpretation is in line 
with the one advocated here, it 
does not exploit what Socrates 
says about the relation between 
elenchus and desire.
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Socrates’ elenchus aims right at the way these 
conventional notions work in Callicles’ thinking. 
Drawing out the consequences of the desire to 
lead a life of enormous pleasure, Socrates reaches 
the point where he says that the regular and 
well-ordered soul is lawful.  What he says is aimed 
at Callicles’ notion of what conforms to convention. 
While implying that the soul that lacks order, 
because its desires are unrestrained, is lawless, he 
is warning Callicles, if he achieves his ideal life of 
enormous pleasure, he will himself become lawless 
and contravene convention (504b-d).  However, as 
we have seen, Callicles fully intends to violate what 
is lawful with respect to justice and temperance; 
this consequence is even desirable.  This part of the 
elenchus, then, will have purchase on Callicles only 
if what is lawful refers to the conventions about 
the catamite and the coward that Socrates has just 
highlighted—in which the pursuit of pleasure, or 
the avoidance of pain, causes one to violate what is 
lawful.  While Callicles does not explicitly say so, it 
is clear that both lives are abhorrent to him.  This 
kind of lawlessness is not the sort that Callicles’ 
bravery entails.  In neither case does Callicles offer 
a justification for his rejection of these two kinds of 
life or for his adherence to the conventions about 
them.  Nor does Socrates seek one.  It seems clear 
that whatever justification he might offer would 
be given in terms of honor, of his standing in the 
culture to which he belongs.
What follows is that, if Socrates has shown 
the inconsistency of the life of enormous pleasure 
and the life of conventional honor, he has revealed 
an incompatibility in Callicles’ desires; he wants 
to lead a life of enormous pleasure — but one 
that will be recognized as intelligent and brave. 
And Socrates has tried to show that he cannot 
satisfy both desires.  Of course, Callicles may not 
be totally convinced but he is at least faced with 
a problem where none existed before.  His problem 
is that Socrates has shown a clash between two 
large-scale desires that have different sources.  His 
desire to lead a life of enormous pleasure is rooted 
in his appetite; it is an ideal of life devoted to the 
cultivation and satisfaction of appetite.  His desire 
to be intelligent and brave is rooted in his love of 
honor, to be recognized by others as intelligent and 
brave.  In its essence, Socrates is posing the problem 
of reconciling appetite and love of honor.
Callicles’ dilemma is usually taken to be 
a puzzle to be solved by a more complex moral 
psychology. While Callicles harbors in his soul 
appetitive desire and love of honor, any other kind 
of desire is at best shadowy. The solution usually 
proposed is the tripartite soul propounded in 
Republic 4, where Socrates introduces the reasoning 
part, whose interest transcends that of appetite 
and of love of honor. Without gainsaying that 
well-attested tradition, I would like to propose 
another way to think about Callicles’ dilemma.  We 
can appreciate the reason the desire to lead a life of 
enormous pleasure and the love of honor might pose 
a dilemma for Callicles by considering a somewhat 
strange type of desire that Socrates describes in 
the Republic (583c-585e) and in the Philebus (50c-
-52b). He wants to point out the existence of a 
kind of pleasure that is unmixed with pain. For our 
purposes, we can look at the Philebus passage, 
without undertaking an exhaustive analysis.  So-
crates cites, among others, examples of pleasures 
associated with most smells and sounds.
…and in general all those that are based on imper-
ceptible and painless lacks (endeias), while their fulfill-
ments (pleroseis) are perceptible and pleasant. (51b)
9 
The talk of lack (emptiness) and fulfillment 
(filling) shows the notion of desire as emptiness and 
its filling as pleasure is still at work.  What is odd, 
of course, is the notion that the lack is unperceived; 
this sounds like a desire that one is unaware of until 
the moment it is being satisfied.  However, this odd 
notion is needed if Socrates is to make good on 
his claim about pleasure unmixed with pain, since 
perception of emptiness is painful.  This relation 
between desire as painful emptiness and pleasure 
as fulfilling is confirmed and extended in what he 
says about the pure pleasure of knowing:
Then let us also add to these the pleasures of lear-
ning (peri ta mathemata), if indeed we are agreed that 
there is no such thing as hunger (peinas) for learning 
9. Passages from the Philebus are 
cited in D. Frede’s translation, in 
Cooper (1997).
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connected with them, nor any pains that have their 
source in hunger for learning (51e-52a)
Denying that there is a hunger for learning 
may strike the reader as even more odd than 
unperceived lack.  We will not consider Socrates’ 
attempt to explain the oddness away.  For our pur-
poses what is important is the reference to a desire 
like hunger, i.e., an appetite.  Socrates cannot be 
denying that we desire to learn; rather, he is denying 
that the desire is like hunger, i.e., experienced as 
painful.  But even this description sounds odd. 
Perhaps, he means (something like) the pleasure of 
learning the proof of the Pythagorean theorem arises 
when we begin to understand what we do not know 
just as we are filling the lack.
This awkward notion, however, has one 
important consequence for our understanding the 
ways in which one might desire a character trait, 
like bravery.  In one case, one might desire to 
have a character trait in such a way that satisfying 
the desire leads to pleasure mixed with pain.  For 
instance, if love of honor is the reason one desi-
res to be brave then the desire for honor — for 
recognition — is experienced as painful; its 
satisfaction mixes pain and pleasure.  One desires to 
be brave because being brave satisfies the hunger 
for honor.  In the second case, one might desire to 
have a character trait in such a way that satisfying 
the desire is pure pleasure; one desires to be brave, 
but not because being brave satisfies a hunger for 
recognition, or any need like it.  One is not aware 
of this kind of desire as a painful lack.  This is a 
desire that breaks through the veil, so to speak, of 
neediness found in other kinds of desire.  Then one 
can desire being bravebecause it is worthy to be 
desired as such, beyond the need that comes from 
the love of honor.  Of course, being brave satisfies 
another kind of need but one that does not distort 
what is needed by confusing it with what is needed 
to relieve pain.  In Socrates’ account, this feature 
means the pleasure of satisfying this other need 
is pure, unmixed with pain.  My proposal is that 
Socrates’ odd notions of unperceived desire and pure 
pleasure is a way of talking about a desire to be 
brave that transcends the need to be recognized by 
others as brave.  This combination shifts the focus 
from the need to be recognized to something like 
pure delight in the goodness of being brave, in the 
way it completes the soul in a way not yet expected.
Assuming this proposal is correct, we can 
see why elenchus does not succeed with Callicles. 
For him, elenchus could not make clear the choice 
between the desire for a life of enormous pleasure 
and the desire to be a brave person because, to 
him, both desires were a painful lack. The first is 
based on the lack of maximum pleasure; the second 
on the lack of recognition, of being honored.  Both 
are painful to him; both cannot be satisfied.  That 
is what elenchus shows. However, suppose Callicles 
had come to realize that he had another kind of 
desire for being brave — one whose awareness 
did not start with the pain of need but with the 
recognition of a need that he understands only 
as it is being satisfied.  One can appreciate why 
uncovering this kind of desire is beyond the reach 
of Socrates’ elenchus in the Gorgias.
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